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Abstract 
 
There now exists a large literature on price transmission in agro-food sectors. However, a 
great majority of empirical studies focus on the existence of asymmetry and, by and large, 
do not allow investigating the reason for its presence or absence. This is in sharp contrast to 
the theoretical literature that provides a number of explanations for why we should expect 
(a)symmetry. In response to this, this paper tries to uncover the reasons for asymmetric 
price transmission in the agro-food chain. To do so, we use meta-analysis drawing on the 
existing studies from this area. Our focus is on the organizational and institutional 
characteristics of the agro-food supply chain. Our findings suggest that asymmetric price 
transmission in farm-retail relationship is more likely to occur in sectors/countries with 
more fragmented farm structure, higher governmental support and more restrictive 
regulations on price controls in retail sector. On the other hand, more restrictive regulations 
on entry barriers in retail sector and relative importance of the sector in question tend to 
promote symmetric farm-retail price transmission. The latter is also more likely in the 
presence of strong processing industry. 
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Aszimmetrikus agrár-/élelmiszerár-transzmisszió okai 
Metaelemzés 
 
Bakucs Zoltán - Jan Fałkowski - Fertő Imre  
 
 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
Immár gazdag irodalom foglalkozik az agrárpiacok ártranszmissziójának kérdéskörével.  Az 
empirikus kutatások nagy része ugyanakkor pusztán az aszimmetria jelenlétének a 
vizsgálatára szorítkozik, és nem magyarázza az ezt előidéző folyamatot. Mindez éles 
ellentétben áll az ártranszmisszió elméleti irodalmával, amely számos (elméleti) 
magyarázattal szolgál az ártranszmissziós (a)szimmetria előfordulására vonatkozóan. 
Tanulmányunkban megkíséreljük felderíteni az agrár-élelmiszeriparban megfigyelt 
ártranszmissziós (a)szimmetria lehetséges okait. Kutatásunkban metaelemzést 
alkalmazunk, amely a nemzetközi irodalomban fellelhető empirikus publikációk 
eredményeire épít. Tanulmányunk fókuszában az agrár-élelmiszeripari kínálati lánc 
szervezési és intézményi sajátosságai állnak. Eredményeink azt mutatják, hogy az 
ártranszmissziós aszimmetria előfordulása valószínűbb az elaprózott bírtokstruktúrával 
rendelkező ágazatok/országok, a nagyobb kormányzati támogatás, valamint a 
kiskereskedelmi szektor restriktívebb hatósági árképzési kontrollja esetén. Másrészt, ahol 
restriktívebb korlátokkal szembesülnek a piacra belépni kívánó kiskereskedelmi egységek, 
vagy nagy a vizsgált ágazat (nemzetgazdasághoz viszonyított) relatív fontossága, ott a 
szimmetrikus termelő/fogyasztó ártranszmisszió jelenléte valószínűbb. Hasonló 
következtetésre jutunk, ha a feldolgozószektor „erős” a kiskereskedelmi ágazathoz képest. 
 
Tárgyszavak: ártranszmisszió, metaelemzés, agrár-élelmiszeripari termékpálya 
 
JEL kódok: Q11 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Market volatility remains one of the most important research fields in agricultural 
economics. On one hand, this is of relevance from micro-perspective as large and 
unexpected price movements strongly affect agricultural households’ welfare. On the other 
hand, market distortions are often cited as a ground for state intervention. In this sense, the 
problem of market volatility is also high on the agenda from macro-perspective. To better 
understand the nature of price movements economists made some effort to analyse the 
mechanism of price transmission, i.e. the way that price movements are transmitted along 
the various stages of the agro-food chain (from farm to processing and retail levels or vice 
versa).  
Studies from this field have tried to see whether price decreases are transmitted along 
the chain with equal speed and/or magnitude as price increases. In recent years a number of 
empirical works have been published that greatly improve our knowledge in this respect 
(see for example Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004 for an overview). This was 
possible, among others, thanks to huge advancement in econometric tools in general, and 
time series analysis in particular. However, the findings of these studies are ambiguous. 
Asymmetries in price transmission have been detected in some countries and sectors but 
not in others. This leads to a general conclusion that the presence of (a)symmetric price 
transmission is conditional on local circumstances. It is disturbing though, that the exact 
mechanisms through which these local conditions affect the nature of price movements 
remain mostly unknown.  
This is interesting since there are a number of theoretical arguments that try to explain 
why price transmission could be asymmetric. In fact, as far as the causes of price 
transmission asymmetries are concerned, the recent literature has paid much more 
attention to theory than empirics. Among the arguments that have been provided to account 
for asymmetric price movements the most commonly cited is the presence of market power 
in retail and/or processing industries (see e.g. McCorriston et al., 1998, 2001). Market 
power in downstream sectors may affect price transmission by depressing purchasing prices 
in upstream sectors below the level of a perfectly functioning market, and/or deter entry or 
foster exit. Asymmetric price transmission can also result from the search costs (Miller and 
Hayenga, 2001). In such case, costumers, although having a finite choice of competing 
retailers, may not be able to find relevant price information, enabling retailers to exercise 
local market power. Other reasons for asymmetric price transmission include the so-called 
‘menu costs’ argument (i.e. costs occurring with the re-pricing and the adoption of a new 
pricing strategy (see, e.g., Bailey and Brorsen, 1989; Levy et al., 1997), the presence of 
 6 
 
inflation (relevant in economies characterised by high inflation rates and/or prolonged 
inflationary environment (see, e.g., Ball and Mankiw, 1994), government support (Kinnucan 
and Forker, 1987) or various stock management practices (Reagan and Weitzman, 1982; 
Wohlgenant, 1985; Balke et al., 1998).  
Given this stark difference between theoretical work and empirical application, this 
paper tries to link the presence of price (a)symmetries with exact causes. The characteristics 
of food markets suggest that these markets are typically oligopolistic (Sexton and Lavoie, 
2001; Sheldon and Sperling, 2003), thus our focus is on the organizational and institutional 
characteristics of the agro-food supply chain that are likely to affect market power. Given 
the concerns about the growing market power of food retailers, we mainly concentrate on 
the latter.  
As mentioned in other studies (see McCorriston, 2002; and Meyer and von Cramon-
Taubadel, 2004), the empirical study of the link between market power and asymmetric 
price transmission presents several challenges. These are mostly related to the issue of retail 
market power measurement and lack of sufficient variation in market power variables. In 
response to this, we propose two innovations. First, we proxy the organisation of retail 
sector with various regulatory indicators that have important advantages over the 
commonly used market concentration ratios. We also complement these measures with 
variables approximating market structure and/or bargaining power of actors at other stages 
of the agro-food sector. This way we link the presence of price transmission asymmetry not 
only to developments in the retail sector, but to various characteristics of the agro-food 
chain as a whole. Second, to take advantage of the fact that the market organisation varies 
considerably across countries and/or sectors, our empirical strategy is based on meta-
analysis and draws on the results of recent papers from the price transmission field. By 
doing so, we aim at complementing the existing literature on price transmission by 
providing some systematic evidence on the causes of asymmetric price movements along 
the agro-food supply chain.  
The closest contribution to our paper is the study by Frey and Manera (2007), who 
employ meta-analysis to studies on price transmission in agricultural and oil markets. Three 
key differences distinguish our approach from theirs. First, we concentrate on research 
published after 2003, resulting in only two common papers. This could be of importance, as 
one can assume that the results from recent papers are based on a more robust 
methodology, encompassing continuous improvements in time series econometrics. Thus 
we aim to reduce the risk of biased results due to misspecification errors that may have 
affected earlier price transmission studies. Second, we restrict our sample to studies 
covering only European agricultural markets. This, in turn, reduces, at least to some extent, 
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the risk that cases under our investigations are not comparable to each other1
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents our 
methodological approach and the data that we use in the empirical analysis. Section 3 
displays our results and Section 4 concludes.  
. Third, and 
perhaps most importantly, Frey and Manera (2007) document only the relationship 
between the presence of price (a)symmetry and methodological approaches used in the 
analysed studies. We instead propose to link price transmission (a)symmetry not only to 
methodological approaches, but also with socio-economic and institutional characteristics 
of sectors/markets under investigation. This is important as it allows to relate our results to 
existing theoretical predictions. Thus, except for applying the ‘old approach’ to new data, we 
also present new results. While the data that we use have some limitations, we nonetheless 
believe that this approach may still offer some new insights on the phenomenon of 
(a)symmetric price transmission. 
2. METHODOLOGY 
Based on the existing theoretical literature, price transmission mechanism could be thought 
of as a function: 
      (1) 
where p denotes the variable that characterises the presence of price transmission 
asymmetry, and X are the socio-economic market characteristics, both referring to country c 
and sector s. W(.) is the reduced-form function that aims at capturing potentially complex 
interactions between these two. X includes, for instance, market structure, regulatory 
framework or bargaining power of actors operating at subsequent stages of the agro-food 
supply chain. The mapping from socio-economic characteristics into price transmission 
mechanism induced by (1) can be studied empirically. To do this, consider the following 
empirical model of the form: 
    (2) 
where δc is a country fixed effect, γs is a sector fixed effect and εcs is an error term. β is a 
vector of coefficients to be estimated.   
Given the fact that the within-country variation in variables included in X is limited, we 
focus on exploiting the between country variation. What follows, our dependent variable 
draws on the results from the existing studies on price transmission (see further). 
                                                        
1 Obviously there is still a great amount of heterogeneity within European agricultural markets. Nevertheless, organization of the European markets, 
especially those within the EU borders, assures somewhat more reliability of the within European comparisons as compared to American-European or 
Asian-European comparisons.  
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Therefore, we couch our empirical analysis in a meta-analysis framework. Meta-analysis is 
the quantitative analysis of a body of studies and aims at evaluating the existing empirical 
evidence (Stanley, 2001). While originally it was used in research areas other than 
agricultural economics, recently it is quickly entering this field as well. Recent ‘agriculture-
oriented’ studies that use this approach include, among others, Hess and von Cramon-
Taubadel (2007), Gallet (2007, 2010), Johnston and Duke (2009) or Lagerkvist and Hess 
(2011).  
Our empirical strategy is as follows. Based on the literature review, we identify studies 
that investigate price behaviour in a number of countries and sectors. We code our 
dependent variable as a dummy equal to one if a given paper found asymmetric price 
transmission and equal to zero otherwise. In a second step, drawing on various sources, we 
collect the data on various socio-economic and institutional characteristics of countries and 
sectors covered by the identified studies. Given the theoretical predictions concerned with 
price transmission asymmetry, we mainly focus on characteristics that may be related to the 
organization of the subsequent stages of the agro-food supply chain. Thus, our focus is on 
variables approximating market structure and bargaining power of farmers, processors and 
retailers. This way we exploit the variation in market characteristics across 
countries/sectors. This helps us to overcome the main shortcoming of 'single-sector' studies 
that can hardly measure the impact of market structure on price transmission unless the 
organisation of the agro-food sector in the given country/sector suffers important changes 
within the study period (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004).  
While the approach we follow presents an important advantage, it also creates an major 
challenge. As mentioned by McCorriston (2002), finding a suitable proxy for market 
structure may pose a substantial difficulty. On one hand, this proxy should be uniform and 
comparable across countries. On the other hand, it should effectively capture the behaviour 
of farmers/processors/retailers and not just the potential that these actors have to behave in 
a certain way. We try to address these issues by using various proxies of the market 
structure at subsequent stages of the agro-food supply chain and follow the literature with 
respect to the way we define them (see further). While the measures we use may still be 
subject to the abovementioned critique, we are not aware of any better proxies available for 
such number of countries/sectors. Thus, while this caveat should be kept in mind when 
interpreting our results, we nonetheless believe that our findings can provide some new 
insights on the linkage between various characteristics of agro-food supply chain and price 
transmission (a)symmetry.  
In order to check the robustness of our analysis we estimate two alternative 
specifications, parametric and semi-nonparametric ones. In addition, to address the 
concern that multiple-results studies may dominate our estimates, both an unweighted and 
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a weighted version of equation (2) are estimated. We follow Hess and von Cramon-Taubadel 
(2008) and use as a weight the importance of each observation which is calculated as a ratio 
of 1 over the number of observations resulted from the underlying study.  
In principle, meta-analysis investigates the extent to which statistical heterogeneity 
between results of multiple studies can be related to methodological characteristics of 
models that these studies apply. Therefore, in our regression analysis we also check whether 
the identified price transmission results are influenced by these methodological 
characteristics. Consequently, in addition to estimating equation (2), we also investigate the 
following relationship: 
    (3) 
where i denotes the study under investigation, ET stands for estimation technique; 
FREQ describes the data frequency, OMC include other model characteristics (whether it is 
a multiple-results or single result study; sample size) and μ is an error term. It should be 
emphasised however, that our aim is not to assess in any way whether these approaches 
were appropriate. Instead we wish to assess whether methodological choices have any 
impact on the obtained results.  
3. DATA 
As far as the data on the presence/absence of price transmission is concerned, we draw on 
the results from 20 recent papers from the price transmission literature. These studies focus 
on European agricultural sector and investigate price transmission mechanism for 69 cases. 
Detailed list of these papers is presented in Table 1. To our knowledge, this is the most 
comprehensive list of studies investigating price behaviour along the European agro-food 
chain. It was based on various scientific data bases including Scopus, Science Direct, 
Emerald, EconLit, Web of Science and Google Scholar.  
 10 
 
Table 1.  
List of identified studies on price transmission in European agro-food chain 
Paper Country Sector 
Bakucs et al. (2006) Germany pork 
Bakucs et al. (2007) Hungary Vegetables 
Bakucs & Ferto (2005) Hungary Pork 
Bakucs & Ferto (2008) Hungary Milk 
Bakucs & Ferto (2006) Hungary Beef 
Bakucs & Ferto (2009) Hungary Pork 
Ben-Kabia & Gil (2007) Spain Lamb 
Bojnec & Peter (2005) Slovenia 
Slovenia 
Pork 
Beef 
Cechura & Sobrova (2008) Czech Republic Pork 
Fałkowski (2010) Poland Milk 
Fernandez et al. (2010) Austria Apple 
Guillen & Franquesa (2010) Spain 
Spain 
Spain 
Spain 
Spain 
Spain 
Pork 
Beef 
Eggs 
Lamb 
Rabbit 
Poultry 
Hassouneh et al. (2010) Spain Beef 
Karantinis et al. (2011) Sweden Pork 
London Economics (2004) Austria 
Austria 
Denmark 
Denmark 
Denmark 
Denmark 
France 
France 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Netherlands 
Netherlands 
Netherlands 
Netherlands 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
Carrot 
Potato 
Vegetables 
Bread 
Flour 
Eggs 
Bread 
Poultry 
Apple 
Potato 
Carrot 
Poultry 
Milk 
Cheese 
Butter 
Potato 
Beef 
Bread 
Eggs 
Potato 
Fruit 
Vegetables 
Vegetables 
Beef 
Lamb 
Bread 
Eggs 
Milk 
Luoma et al. 2004 Finland Pork 
Luoma et al. 2004 Finland Beef 
Reziti & Panagopuolos (2008) Greece 
Greece 
Greece 
Greece 
Greece 
Greece 
Vegetables 
Fruit 
Food 
Vegetables  
Fruit  
Food 
Rezitis & Reziti (2011) Greece Milk 
Serra & Goodwin (2003) Spain 
Spain 
Spain 
Spain 
Milk 
Milk 
Milk 
Milk 
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Next we briefly present some basic information on the studies that we use in our analysis. 
Most importantly, price transmission asymmetry has been detected in 28 cases whereas in 
the remaining 41 cases the authors concluded symmetric price behaviour. While price 
transmission could be analysed for different pairs of actors operating at various stages of the 
agro-food supply chain, almost all of the cases that we identified (67) relate to farm-retail 
price transmission. The remaining two cases relate to farm-wholesale relationship and to 
farm-processor relationship. As presented in Table 2, our sample is not uniformly 
distributed over geographic regions or countries. Most of the observations, 57, are for the 
Western Europe (the so-called ‘Old EU Members’) and only 12 are for the Central and 
Eastern European countries (New Member States). Moreover, five countries, namely Spain, 
the United Kingdom, Hungary, Germany and Greece account for almost 2/3 of the entire 
sample.  
 
Table 2.  
Number of observations by country 
Country N % of all obs. % of all cases detecting APT 
Austria 5 7.2 10.7 
Czech 1 1.4 3.6 
Denmark 4 5.8 0.0 
Finland 2 2.9 0.0 
France 2 2.9 3.6 
Germany 8 11.6 7.1 
Greece 7 10.1 14.3 
Hungary 8 11.6 7.1 
Netherlands 4 5.8 0.0 
Poland 1 1.4 3.6 
Slovenia 2 2.9 3.6 
Spain 14 20.3 35.7 
Sweden 3 4.3 7.1 
United Kingdom 8 11.6 3.6 
Total 69 100.0 100.0 
Source: Own calculations based on literature sample 
 
 
Further, as reported in Table 3, most of the cases under investigation (43) concern livestock 
products. Crop production is represented by 26 observations, and thus accounts for roughly 
38% of our sample.  
 
 
 
 
 12 
 
Table 3.  
Number of observations by sector 
product N % of all obs. % of all cases detecting APT 
livestock 43 62.3 82.1 
vegetables 8 11.6 7.1 
fruit 5 7.2 0.0 
food 2 2.9 7.1 
potato 6 8.7 0.0 
cereals 5 7.2 3.6 
total 69 100.0 100.0 
Source: Own calculations based on literature sample 
 
Tables 4-6 present some methodological characteristics of the studies under consideration. 
The majority of cases, 52 (75%), couch the analysis in a vector error correction models 
(VECM) framework. 12 studies, i.e. 17% of the total number of observations, use threshold 
VECM approach. There are a few studies that are based on the earliest methodological 
approach to investigate price transmission mechanism, namely pre-cointegration 
techniques (6 cases, i.e. roughly 9% of all identified studies).2
Table 4.  
 Further, the majority of 
studies use monthly rather than weekly data (Table 5). Finally, of the 56 studies that 
investigated the direction of price information flow, 20 report the causality running from 
farm to retail, 7 reports the opposite direction, whereas 29 report the causality running in 
both directions (Table 6).  
Number of observations by methodology 
methodology  N % of 
all 
obs. 
% of all 
cases 
detecting 
APT 
Houck  6 8.7 14 
VECM 40 58.0 32 
TVECM 12 17.4 7 
Gregory-Hansen 4 5.8 32 
Regime switching 1 1.4 4 
General-to specific 3 4.3 4 
Asymmetric non-linear auto regressive distributed lag model 3 4.3 7 
total 69 100.0 100 
Source: Own calculations based on literature sample 
 
 
                                                        
2 As one of the earliest application of this approach was the study by Houck (1977), in Table 4 we refer to it as 
‘Houck approach’.  
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Table 5. 
 Number of observations by data frequency 
frequency N % of all obs. % of all cases detecting APT 
monthly 62 89.9 82.1 
weekly 7 10.1 17.9 
total 69 100.0 100.0 
Source: Own calculations based on literature sample 
 
Table 6.  
Number of observations by causality 
causality direction N % of all obs. % of all cases detecting APT 
causality farm to retail 20 35.7 52.6 
causality retail to farm 7 12,5 10.5 
bidirectional causality 29 51,8 36.8 
total 56 100.0 100.0 
Source: Own calculations based on literature sample; 
 
Dependent variable 
As mentioned earlier, our dependent variable shows the presence/absence of price 
transmission asymmetry. Accordingly, it is a dummy variable equal to one if the paper 
detects asymmetric price transmission and equal to zero if symmetric transmission has been 
detected.  
 
Independent variables 
The selection of explanatory variables included in our regression is a crucial decision, since 
they should be consistent with theories providing explanations for the presence of price 
transmission asymmetry. On the other hand however, inflating the number of socio-
economic characteristic variables, quickly reduces the degrees of freedom and induces 
potential multicollinearity in regression results. Thus, to investigate the effect of the agro-
food supply chain characteristics upon price transmission asymmetry, we include a limited 
number of covariates. 
The first three of them refer to the organisation of the farming sector. Variable 
relative_weight measures the relative size of the sector, captured by the number of farm 
holdings operating in a given sector (standardized over total number of farm holdings in a 
given country). The inclusion of this variable is supported by predictions originating from 
the interest group theory that relates the strength of an interest group to a number of its 
members (Olson, 1965). According to this theory, the larger the group, the higher 
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transaction costs need to be in order to decide about, and undertake, certain actions. It 
follows, this variable is expected to positively affect the presence of price transmission 
asymmetry as it should be negatively correlated with farmers’ bargaining power. Another 
somewhat related argument points to the fact that the higher the number of farmers in a 
given production sector, the easier it should be for the retailer to find a potential supplier. 
To construct this variable, we use the EU Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN).  
To further control for farmers’ bargaining power, we also include two other variables 
aiming to capture the sector’s farm structure. On the one hand, we control for the share of 
land utilised by farm holdings of economic size between 0 and 4 ESU (variable 0_4_ESU). 
This way we control for the relative farm fragmentation/importance of the smallest farms. 
To also control for the other extreme, we include the variable 100_over_ESU which 
measures the share of land operated by farm holdings equal to, or larger than 100 ESU. This 
variable aims at capturing the relative strength of largest farms. Since it is plausible to 
assume that farm’s economic size is positively related to its bargaining position vis-a-vis 
downstream sector, we expect the variable 0_4_ESU (100_over_ESU) to have a positive 
(negative) effect on the probability to observe asymmetric price transmission. These data 
also come from the FADN.  
While the former three variables aimed at capturing most important characteristics of 
the farm sector, we also control for main characteristics of the retail sector. In general, there 
are two main problems with variables that could be used here. First, the literature is not 
unanimous with respect to the proxy that one should use to measure the retailers’ 
bargaining power (see e.g. Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004). Second, even if we 
assume that the first problem is solved, it is still quite difficult to find the data on a uniform 
measure that would be available for more than a few countries. Given these problems and 
the ongoing debate, we focus here on regulations governing the retail trade. These data 
come from the OECD and were collected via the OECD Regulatory Indicators Questionnaire 
(Conway and Nicoletti, 2006). While these data point to a number of important aspects of 
the functioning of retail sector, it should be noted that the regulatory indicators that we use 
concern the whole retail sector and not just food retailing as such. This should be kept in 
mind while interpreting our results. More specifically, we look at regulations related to 
entry barriers, operation restrictions, and pricing policies. These data seem to have an 
important advantage over the commonly used market concentration ratios. They allow 
capturing an institutional environment within which retailers operate, regardless of their 
market share. Thus, we believe that they allow capturing important constraints that shape 
interactions within a retail sector and between retailers and upstream sectors in the agro-
food chain. Thus our regulatory indicators aim to capture, at least partly, the incentive 
structure that retailers face and that drive their behaviour, an issue which cannot be 
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captured by a downstream market power index. Also note, that institutional features, 
including the regulations governing retail trade, are commonly assumed to be exogenous. 
This is of importance from an econometric point of view and presents additional advantage 
over a simple market concentration ratio which is likely to be endogenous. Obviously the 
validity of this assumption would depend on the extent to which these regulations do not 
vary over time. Based on these data we construct three variables: entry_barriers, 
operational_restrictions and price_controls. Each index is ranging from 0 to 6 with higher 
values indicating more restrictive regulations. The former two variables seem to act in 
favour of smaller retailers as compared to large-scale retailers (normally entry barriers 
and/or operational restrictions relate to hyper- and super-markets rather than to smaller 
shops). If this is the case, they improve farms’ bargaining position vis-a-vis retailers, to the 
extent they contribute to a more balanced bargaining power between farms and retailers, 
and thus they should promote symmetric price transmission. It should be noted however, 
that entry barriers shelter incumbent retailers and this should strengthen bargaining 
position of the latter. It follows, that an opposite effect of entry_barriers cannot be 
excluded. As far as the expected impact of price_controls on price transmission asymmetry 
is concerned, it should be positive. This is because, limits imposed on the price competition 
between retailers may result in stronger pressure to use vertical pricing policy to increase 
market share. Asymmetric price adjustments can be regarded as an example of such policy.  
To have a complete coverage of subsequent stages of the agro-food supply chain, we also 
include a variable measuring the relative strength of the processing industry. Variable 
food_retail measures ratio of the average turnover per manufacturing enterprise in a given 
agricultural sector to average turnover per retail enterprise in a given agricultural sector. 
The average is calculated over the period 1995-2008.3
In addition, to account for the fact that price transmission mechanism can be related to 
government intervention, the average value of Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRAavg) (by 
product during analysed period) is included among regressors. The NRA measures the total 
transfer to agriculture as a percentage of the undistorted unit value and comes from World 
Bank Agricultural Distortion Database (
 This variable is based on Eurostat 
data.  
www.worldbank.org/agdistortions). According to 
theory, we expect this variable to positively influence the presence of asymmetric price 
transmission. 
Finally, to take into account geographical and, to some extent, historical characteristics 
of sectors/countries covered in our sample, we classify countries into two groups: Western 
refers to old EU member states whilst Eastern describes Central European countries.  
                                                        
3 In some cases however, data was not available for the full period, thus the average calculated over the shorter 
time-span was used.  
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As far as the regressions linking price transmission asymmetry to methodological 
aspects are concerned, we use the following explanatory variables. Variable Houck is a 
dummy distinguishing papers that use the pre-cointegration approach. Variable VECM on 
the other hand is a dummy distinguishing studies relying on vector error correction models. 
All other papers, i.e. those that rely on non-linear methodologies, act as a reference group. 
Given that methodological advancements in econometrics allow for a much more detailed 
scrutiny of the data, we expect the more recent methods, i.e. non-linear ones, to be more 
likely to detect some imperfections in price transmission mechanism and thus the presence 
of asymmetric price transmission. Further, as mentioned in some studies (see e.g. Frey and 
Manera, 2007; Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004; or von Cramon-Taubadel et al., 
2006) the outcome of price transmission investigation may depend on the frequency and 
aggregation characteristics of the data used. More specifically, less frequent data may mask 
important adjustments (or lack of those) that occure within shorter periods. To address this 
issue, in our methodological regressions we also include the dummy variable monthly 
capturing studies with monthly data frequency. Studies with weekly data act as a reference 
point. In accordance with the argument presented above, we expect a negative coefficient on 
this variable suggesting that studies with monthly data are less likely to detect price 
transmission asymmetry than studies with weekly data.  
4. RESULTS 
In order to examine the relationships between asymmetric price transmission and 
explanatory variables, we estimated various binary models. The binary models are typically 
estimated by maximum likelihood after imposing distributional assumptions of error term. 
However, semi parametric literature emphasise that parametric estimators of discrete 
choice models are known to be sensitive to departures from distributional assumptions. 
Various estimators have been developed for correcting this restrictive nature of parametric 
models including semi-nonparametric approach of Gallant and Nychka (1987) and the semi 
parametric maximum likelihood approach of Klein and Spady (1993). Recent literature 
emphasises that semi-nonparametric and semiparametric maximum likelihood estimators 
substantially dominate the parametric probit maximum likelihood estimator (De Luca 
2008). Therefore, in this paper we employ semi-nonparametric approach.  
We begin with a brief presentation of the results that were obtained from estimating 
equation (3), i.e. ‘methodological specification’. They are reported in Table 7 and can be 
summarised as follows. First, in line with our expectations, the probability to detect 
asymmetric price transmission is higher for studies using methodological approaches other 
than Houck or VECM. Second, asymmetries are more likely to be found in studies using 
weekly rather than monthly data and in studies with a larger sample size. This is fully in line 
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with arguments and findings presented elsewhere (e,g. von Cramon et al., 2003; Frey and 
Manera, 2007). Third, there is also some evidence that asymmetries are found more often 
for livestock rather than crop products.  
Table 7.  
Price transmission asymmetries & modelling approach – semi-
nonparametric maximum likelihood estimator 
 1 2 3 4 
  weighted  weighted 
VECM -3.947*** -3.341*** -2.234*** -1.928*** 
Houck -2.078* -1.606** -4.153*** -4.467*** 
Monthly -1.696 -1.656 -3.950*** -4.586*** 
Number of observation -0.013** -0.012** -0.009*** -0.007 
Livestock   2.417*** 1.855*** 
     
Log pseudolikelihood -37.6045 -12.619 -35.926 -12.377 
N 69 69 69 69 
Source: Own computations 
 
We now move to present results from specifications linking the presence of price 
transmission asymmetries to socio-economic characteristics of the agro-food chain. Our 
main results are reported in Table 8. Columns 1,3,5 report unweighted regressions whereas 
columns 2,4,6 report weighted regressions. Our basic specification is presented in columns 1 
and 2. The other columns present specifications with additional covariates thus checking for 
the robustness of findings. Several interesting points arise from this analysis. First, contrary 
to what could be expected from Olson’s (1965) interest group theory, the coefficient of the 
relative_weight variable is persistently negative and in most cases statistically significant. It 
follows that the probability of asymmetric price transmission is lower, the bigger the sector 
under investigation. A possible explanation of the negative coefficient might be that a higher 
share of farms operating in a specific sector with respect to total number of farms reflects 
the importance of that sector for politicians and regulators. This refers to political economy 
considerations that put both social as well as voting issues to the front. The next two 
explanatory variables provide further insights about the role that farm structure may play 
for price transmission mechanism. As shown in Table 8, asymmetric movements are 
positively correlated with the share of land operated by the smallest holdings classified 
between 0 and 4 ESU. This results however is slightly less robust than the previous one, as 
in the weighted regressions the estimated coefficients are never statistically significant. 
Together these results suggest that the presence of asymmetric price transmission is more 
(less) likely the more fragmented (concentrated) is the farm structure which is fully 
consistent with expectations.  
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Table 8.  
Price transmission asymmetries & agro-food supply chain characteristics – 
semi-nonparametric maximum likelihood estimator  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
  weighted  weighted  weighted 
Entry_barriers -0.400* -0.357 -1.006*** -1.059*** -1.748*** -1.603*** 
Price_control 0.247 1.065*** 0.862** 2.789*** 0.682* 1.006*** 
Operational_restrictions 0.160 -0.021 0.366 -0.243 0.724** 1.642*** 
Relative_weight -2.458*** -4.467** -4.421 -9.303*** -3.327 -11.669*** 
0_4_ESU 8.232*** -0.544 17.442*** -1.315 28.837*** 5.391 
100_over_ESU 1.732* -1.649 2.761 -2.103** 1.994 -1.444* 
Food_retail -0.047*** -0.057*** -0.023** -0.050*** -0.026 -0.051*** 
NRAavg   0.638 1.328** 2.071*** 1.394*** 
Western     -1.124* -3.492*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -24.622 -5.490 -19.113 -3.5423 -18.022 -3.206 
N 57 57 45 45 45 45 
 
Moving on to the impact of regulations affecting the retail sector, we find that 
asymmetric price transmission is less likely in a scenario where retailers’ activities are 
constrained by entry_barriers regulations and this result seems to be very robust. At first 
glance, this result could be counter intuitive as entry barriers shelter incumbents from 
potential rivals and thus may lead to increased margins and, possibly, more rigid price 
adjustments. Note, however, that entry barriers, if put in place, are mostly directed against 
large-scale retailers. This, in turn, should act in favour of smaller retailers, possibly allowing 
them to increase their market share. Given that retailers’ size should be an important 
determinant of their bargaining power, this may at the same time be beneficial to farmers. 
Consequently, our results are consistent with the considerations stating that the more 
balanced the bargaining power of farmers and retailers, the more likely one should observe 
symmetric price transmission.  
Quite surprisingly, we find some evidence that price transmission is more likely to be 
asymmetric in the presence of regulations restricting large retailers opening hours 
(operational_restrictions). While we expected this variable to affect price transmission 
mechanism in similar vein as entry_barriers, apparently some more inquiry into this 
specific regulation should be taken in future work to explain this discrepancy.  
Further, robust results (price_control variable) indicate that price movements tend to 
be more asymmetric if price competition between retailers is limited (price controls may 
forbid, for instance, putting the dumping prices/keeping retail prices too low). A possible 
interpretation to account for this result could be the following. Price controls (strongly) 
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limit the set of ‘horizontal-competition’ tools that retailers may use to increase their market 
share. Consequently, they may resort to ‘vertical-competition’ tools, i.e. try to increase their 
market share through delayed and/or asymmetric adjustments in prices along the supply 
chain.  
We next look at the potential impact of the processing industry, and find that farm-
retail price transmission asymmetry is less likely to occur when food manufacturing 
turnover (per enterprise) relative to retailers’ turnover is higher (food_retail variable). A 
potential explanation draws on the fact that in the situation where processing industry plays 
a dominant role in the supply chain, price asymmetries may now move to farm-processor 
and processor-retailer relationships. In such case, farm and retail prices may move together, 
so symmetric transmission is more likely to be observed. Available data unfortunately do 
not enable us to directly test this hypothesis.  
Regarding the impact of government intervention, results are as expected and in line 
with theory formulated by Kinnucan and Forker (1987). More specifically, we find a positive 
influence on price transmission asymmetry, suggesting that downstream industries are 
(perfectly) aware and anticipate government farm intervention when deciding upon pricing 
strategies.  
Finally, the sign of the Western dummy variable indicates that price transmission 
asymmetry is more often found in studies examining price movements in ‘Old EU Member 
States’ as compared to studies investigating the situation in NMS.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we investigate the underlying reasons for price transmission (a)symmetries. 
Our methodology rests on meta-analysis and thus empirical results obtained from a number 
of studies in the field. More specifically, we try to relate the presence/absence of price 
transmission asymmetry in farm-retail relations detected by the existing studies to various 
characteristics of the agro-food supply chain. Our focus is on factors that are likely to affect 
the bargaining power of actors operating at subsequent stages of the supply chain. In 
addition, we investigate the extent to which the results found in the literature on price 
transmission are influenced by the methodological approaches that formed the basis for 
these findings.  
Overall, our results are in line with the existing theories predicting that price 
transmission asymmetries are more likely in the presence of (retailers’) market power. More 
specifically, we find that asymmetries are present in sectors with higher number of 
fragmented farm producers and less likely to occur with more concentrated farm structure. 
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Interestingly, price transmission mechanism seems to be symmetric in sectors that are 
likely to be of high political clout. Further, price transmission asymmetries seem to be 
related to regulatory framework that governs the operation of retail sector. Our results 
suggest that asymmetries are less likely in the presence of entry barriers on retail trade but 
more likely in the presence of operational restrictions. On the other hand, distortions in the 
price relationship between retailers and suppliers are more likely to occur in the presence of 
regulations limiting price competition between retailers. Finally, we show some evidence 
that farm-retail price relationship tends to be asymmetric in the presence of governmental 
intervention and symmetric in the presence of strong processing sector. The latter may be 
valid if processors are dominant players in the supply chain and thus influence both farm 
and retail prices.  
Obviously, there is a question to what extent our results are affected by the, so called, 
omitted variables bias. Note that our data do not provide any information about stock 
management practices or menu costs, i.e. factors that are mentioned as important price 
transmission determinants in addition to market power. This, in turn, may impact our 
results. Further, we do not have any direct measure on the bargaining power of agents 
operating at subsequent stages of the supply chain. Consequently, we have to rely on 
proxies. This obviously raises the question whether these proxies are indeed appropriate. 
These issues clearly point that the results we show should be treated with caution. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the approach that we adopt here can help improving our 
understanding of factors responsible for asymmetric price movements. Clearly, much 
remains to be done, however we hope this paper is a building block towards bridging the 
gap between theory and empirics with respect to the causes of (a)symmetric price 
transmission.  
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